Learning Module 2 - Activity
Two
Propaganda and Censorship in World War I[1]
Learning Objective: To consider the positive and negative
roles of censorship and propaganda during wartime
Historical Context: When Woodrow Wilson asked Congress for a Declaration of
War on Germany in April 1917, many Americans were against the war. As a matter
of act, the police had barricades at the Capital building to keep the war
protesters at a distance.
Nonetheless, Congress agreed and the United States joined England and
France in the war against Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire. Wilson
effectively argued that the United States’ participation in that war was necessary
to “make the world safe for democracy.” As you have learned from your textbook,
Wilson also established the Committee on Public Information, an agency that
“sold” the war to the American public through censorship and propaganda (see pgs.
649-653 & “Reliving the Past”).
Section One requires that you
Section Two requires that you
·
Consider
the use of censorship of images during World War I.
·
For
this, you will watch a video excerpt from the History of American Photography as well as additional photographs
and paintings of trench warfare.
Section Three requires that you
·
Consider
the use of propaganda during World War I by reading about the basic concepts
and practices of propaganda. “War
Propaganda – World War I – Demons, atrocities, and lies. (document included in this activity)
·
Next,
you will be asked to examine propaganda posters generated by the federal
government during World War I.
Section One: Censorship
Step One:
Step Two:
·
Using
the information from Step One, consider and answer the following questions:
1. Today, newspapers, magazines, and
television publish and/or show photographs of conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Africa. Are these images censored? If not, should they be?
2. Answer the following question: “Do you
think that the federal government should use censorship to keep the more brutal
images from being published? Why or why not?” Be sure to provide one or two
specific examples that support your opinion.
Section Two: Propaganda
Step One: Overview - Why Study
Propaganda?
To
better understand the concept and use of propaganda, read the following
information. This information is posted
on the Propaganda website. The relevant documents from that website are
included with this activity.
Step Two: World War I Posters
1.
Imagine
you lived in 1917 – 1918. What would be your reaction to this poster? What do
you think that this poster tells you about America’s commitment in the war? How
does this “message” make you feel?
2.
Now
look at the poster again, this time more critically. Analyze the image (s), the
colors, and the presentation. What kinds of people are depicted? What event
might the poster refer to? Who is the target audience for this poster and what
is the poster asking that audience to do?
War Propaganda > World War I - The Committee
on Public Information
The
absence of public unity was a primary concern when America entered the war on
April 6, 1917. In Washington, unwavering public support was considered to be
crucial to the entire wartime effort. On April 13, 1917, Wilson created the
Committee on Public Information (CPI) to promote the war domestically while
publicizing American war aims abroad. Under the leadership of a muckraking
journalist named George Creel, the CPI recruited heavily from business, media,
academia, and the art world. The CPI blended advertising techniques with a
sophisticated understanding of human psychology, and its efforts represent the
first time that a modern government disseminated propaganda on such a large
scale. It is fascinating that this phenomenon, often linked with totalitarian
regimes, emerged in a democratic state.
Although
George Creel was an outspoken critic of censorship at the hands of public
servants, the CPI took immediate steps to limit damaging information. Invoking
the threat of German propaganda, the CPI implemented "voluntary
guidelines" for the news media and helped to pass the Espionage Act of
1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918. The CPI did not have explicit enforcement
power, but it nevertheless "enjoyed censorship power which was tantamount
to direct legal force." Like modern reporters who participate in Pentagon
press pools, journalists grudgingly complied with the official guidelines in
order to stay connected to the information loop. Radical newspapers, such as
the socialist Appeal to Reason, were almost completely extinguished by wartime
limitations on dissent. The CPI was not a censor in the strictest sense, but
"it came as close to performing that function as any government agency in
the US has ever done."
Censorship
was only one element of the CPI's efforts. With all the sophistication of a
modern advertising agency, the CPI examined the different ways that information
flowed to the population and flooded these channels with pro-war material. The
CPI's domestic division was composed of 19 sub-divisions, and each focused on a
particular type of propaganda. A comprehensive survey is beyond the scope of
this paper, but the use of newspapers, academics, artists, and filmmakers will
be discussed.
One of the
most important elements of the CPI was the Division of News, which distributed
more than 6,000 press releases and acted as the primary conduit for war-related
information. According to Creel, on any given week, more than 20,000 newspaper
columns were filled with material gleaned from CPI handouts. Realizing that
many Americans glided right past the front page and headed straight for the
features section, the CPI also created the Division of Syndicated Features and
recruited the help of leading novelists, short story writers, and essayists.
These popular American writers presented the official line in an easily
digestible form, and their work was said to have reached twelve million people
every month.
The
Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation relied heavily on scholars who
churned out pamphlets with titles such as The German Whisper, German War
Practices, and Conquest and Kultarr. The academic rigor of many of these pieces
was questionable, but more respectable thinkers, such as John Dewey and Walter
Lippmann, also voiced their support for the war. Even in the face of this
trend, however, a few scholars refused to fall in line. Randolph Bourne had been
one John Dewey's star students, and he felt betrayed by his mentor's
collaboration with the war effort. In one of several eloquent wartime essays,
Bourne savagely attacked his colleagues for self-consciously guiding the
country into the conflict. "[T]he German intellectuals went to war to save
their culture from barbarization," wrote Bourne. "And the French went
to war to save their beautiful France! ...
Are not our intellectuals equally fatuous when they tell us that our war of all
wars is stainless and thrillingly achieving for good?"
The
CPI did not limit its promotional efforts to the written word. The Division of
Pictorial Publicity "had
at its disposal many of the most talented advertising illustrators and
cartoonists of the time," and these artists worked closely
with publicity experts in the Advertising Division. Newspapers and magazines eagerly donated
advertising space, and it was almost impossible to pick up a periodical without
encountering CPI material. Powerful posters, painted in patriotic colors, were
plastered on billboards across the country. Even from the cynical vantage point
of the mid 1990s, there is something compelling about these images that leaps
across the decades and stirs a deep yearning to buy liberty bonds or enlist in
the navy.
Moving
images were even more popular than still ones, and the Division of Films
ensured that the war was promoted in the cinema. The film industry suffered
from a sleazy reputation, and producers sought respectability by lending
wholehearted support to the war effort. Hollywood's mood was summed up in a
1917 editorial in The Motion Picture News which proclaimed that "every individual at
work in this industry wants to do his share" and promised
that "through
slides, film leaders and trailers, posters, and newspaper publicity they will
spread that propaganda so necessary to the immediate mobilization of the
country's great resources." Movies with titles like The
Kaiser: The Beast of Berlin, Wolves of Kultur, and Pershing's
Crusaders flooded American theaters. One picture, To Hell With The Kaiser, was so popular
that Massachusetts riot police were summoned to deal with an angry mob that had
been denied admission.
The
preceding discussion merely hints at the breadth of CPI domestic propaganda
activities. From lecture hall podiums and movie screens to the pages of popular
fiction and the inside of payroll envelopes, the cause of the Allies was
creatively publicized in almost every available communication channel. But this
is only part of the story. The propaganda techniques employed by the CPI are
also fascinating, and, from the standpoint of democratic government, much more
significant.
George Creel, How
We Advertised America[2]
Chapter One: THE “SECOND LINES”
Back of the
firing-line, back of armies and navies, back of the great supply-depots,
another struggle waged with the same intensity and with almost equal
significance attaching to its victories and defeats. It was the fight for the minds
of men, for the “conquest of their convictions,” and the battle-line ran
through every home in every country.
It was in
this recognition of Public Opinion as a major force that the Great War differed
most essentially from all previous conflicts. The trial of strength was not
only between massed bodies of armed men, but between opposed ideals, and moral
verdicts took on all the value of military decisions. Other wars went no deeper
than the physical aspects, but German Kultur raised issues that had to
be fought out in the hearts and minds of people as well as on the actual
firing-line. The approval of the world meant the steady flow of inspiration
into the trenches; it meant the strengthened resolve and the renewed
determination of the civilian population that is a nation's second line. The
condemnation of the world meant the destruction of morale and the surrender of
that conviction of justice which is the very heart of courage.
The
Committee on Public Information was called into existence to make this fight
for the “verdict of mankind,” the voice created to plead the justice of
America's cause before the jury of Public Opinion. The fantastic legend that
associated gags and muzzles with its work may be likened only to those trees
which are evolved out of the air by Hindu magicians and which rise, grow, and
flourish in gay disregard of such usual necessities as roots, sap, and
sustenance. In no degree was the Committee an agency of censorship, a machinery
of concealment or repression. Its emphasis throughout was on the open and the
positive. At no point did it seek or exercise authorities under those war laws
that limited the freedom of speech and press. In all things, from first to
last, without halt or change, it was a plain publicity proposition, a vast
enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest pleasure in advertising.
Under the
pressure of tremendous necessities an organization grew that not only reached
deep into every American community, but that carried to every corner of the
civilized globe to the full message of America's idealism, unselfishness, and
indomitable purpose. We fought prejudice, indifference, and disaffection at
home and we fought ignorance and falsehood abroad. We strove for the
maintenance of our own morale and the Allied morale by every process of
stimulation; every possible expedient was employed to break through the barrage
of lies that kept the people of the Central Powers in darkness and delusion; we
sought the friendship and support of the neutral nations by continuous
presentation of facts. We did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German
hands, had come to be associated with deceit and corruption. Our effort was
educational and informative throughout, for we had such confidence in our case
as to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, straightforward
presentation of facts.
There was
no part of the Great War machinery that we did not touch, no medium of appeal
that we did not employ. The printed word, the spoken word, the motion picture,
the telegraph, the cable, the wireless, the poster, the sign-board—all these
were used in our campaign to make our own people and all other peoples
understand the causes that compelled America to take arms. All that was fine
and ardent in the civilian population came at our call until more than one
hundred and fifty thousand men and women were devoting highly specialized
abilities to the work of the Committee, as faithful and devoted in their
service …
While
America's summons was answered without question by the citizenship as a whole,
it is to be remembered that during the three and a half years of our neutrality
the land had been torn by a thousand divisive prejudices, stunned by the voices
of anger and confusion, and muddled by the pull and haul of opposed interests.
These were conditions that could not be permitted to endure. What we had to
have was no mere surface unity, but a passionate belief in the justice of
America's unity, but a passionate belief in the justice of America's cause that
should weld the people of the United States into one white-hot mass instinct
with fraternity, devotion, courage, and deathless determination. The war-will
, the will to win, of a democracy depends upon the degree to which each one
of all the people of that democracy can concentrate and consecrate body and
soul and spirit in the supreme effort of service and sacrifice. What had to be
driven home was that all business was the nation's business and every task a
common task for a single purpose.
Starting
with the initial conviction that the war was not the war of an administration,
but the war of one hundred million people, and believing that public support
was a matter of public understanding, we opened up the activities of government
to the inspection of the citizenship. A voluntary censorship agreement
safeguarded military information of obvious value to the enemy, but in all else
the rights of the press were recognized and furthered. Trained men, at the
center of effort in every one of the war-making branches of government,
reported on progress and achievement, and in no other belligerent nation was
there such absolute frankness with respect to every detail of the national war
endeavor.
As swiftly
as might be, there were put into pamphlet form America's reasons for entering
the war, the meaning of America, the nature of our free institutions, our war
aims, likewise analyses of the Prussian system, the purposes of the imperial
German government, and full exposure of the enemy's misrepresentations,
aggressions, and barbarities. Written by the country's foremost publicists,
scholars, historians, and distinguished for their conciseness, accuracy, and
simplicity, these pamphlets blew as a great wind against the clouds of
confusion and misrepresentation. Money could not have purchased the volunteer
aid that was given freely, the various universities lending their best men and
the National Board of Historical Service placing its three thousand members at the
complete disposal of the Committee. Some thirty-odd booklets, covering every
phase of America's ideals, purposes, and aims, were printed in many languages
other than English. Seventy-five millions reached the people of America, and
other millions went to every corner of the world, carrying our defense and our
attack.
The
importance of the spoken word was not underestimated. A speaking division
toured great groups like the Blue Devils, Pershing's Veterans, and the
Belgians, arranged mass-meetings in the communities, conducted forty-five war
conferences from coast to coast, coordinated the entire speaking activities of
the nation, and assured consideration to the crossroads hamlet as well as to
the city.
The Four
Minute Men, an organization that will live in history by reason of its
originality and effectiveness, commanded the volunteer services of 75,000
speakers, operating in 5,200 communities, and making a total of 755,190
speeches, every one having the carry of shrapnel.
With the
aid of a volunteer staff of several hundred translators, the Committee kept in
direct touch with the foreign-language press, supplying selected articles
designed to combat ignorance and disaffection. It organized and directed
twenty-three societies and leagues designed to appeal to certain classes and
particular foreign-language groups, each body carrying a specific message of
unity and enthusiasm to its section of America's adopted peoples.
It planned
war exhibits for the state fairs of the United States, also a great series of international
war expositions that brought home to our millions the exact nature of the
struggle that was being waged in France. In Chicago alone two million people
attended in two weeks, and in nineteen cities the receipts aggregated
$1,432,261.36.
The Committee
mobilized the advertising forces of the country—press, periodical, car, and
outdoor—for the patriotic campaign that gave millions of dollars' worth of free
space to the national service.
It
assembled the artists of America on a volunteer basis for the production of
posters, window-cards, and similar material of pictorial publicity for the use
of various government departments and patriotic societies. A total of 1,438
drawings were used.
It issued
an official daily newspaper, serving every department of government, with a
circulation of one hundred thousand copies a day. For official use only, its
value was such that private citizens ignored the supposedly prohibitive
subscription price, subscribing to the amount of $77,622.58.
It
organized a bureau of information for all persons who sought direction in
volunteer war-work, in acquiring knowledge of any administrative activities, or
in approaching business dealings with the government. In the ten months of its
existence it gave answers to eighty-six thousand requests for specific
information.
It gathered
together the leading novelists, essayists, and publicists of the land, and
these men and women, without payment, worked faithfully in the production of
brilliant, comprehensive articles that went to the press as syndicate features.
One
division paid particular attention to the rural press and the plate-matter
service. Others looked after the specialized needs of the labor press, the
religious press, and the periodical press. The Division of Women's War Work
prepared and issued the information of peculiar interest to the women of the
United States, also aiding in the task of organizing and directing.
Through the
medium of the motion picture, America's war progress, as well as the meanings
and purposes of democracy, were carried to every community in the United States
and to every corner of the world. “Pershing's Crusaders,” “America's Answer,”
and “Under Four Flags” were types of feature films by which we drove home
America's resources and determinations, while other pictures, showing our
social and industrial life, made our free institutions vivid to foreign
peoples. From the domestic showings alone, under a fair plan of distribution,
the sum of $878,215 was gained, which went to support the cost of the campaigns
in foreign countries where the exhibitions were necessarily free.
Another
division prepared and distributed still photographs and stereopticon slides to
the press and public. Over two hundred thousand of the latter were issued at
cost. This division also conceived the idea of the “permit system,” that opened
up our military and naval activities to civilian camera men, and operated it
successfully. It handled, also, the voluntary censorship of still and motion
pictures in order that there might be no disclosure of information valuable to
the enemy. The number of pictures reviewed averaged seven hundred a day.
War
Propaganda > World War I - Demons, atrocities, and lies
Defining Propaganda
The
word "propaganda" has already been used several times, and the reader
may wonder how this term is being used. The definition of propaganda has been
widely debated, but there is little agreement about what it means. Some argue
that all persuasive communication is propagandistic, while others suggest that
only dishonest messages can be considered propaganda. Political activists of
all stripes claim that they speak the truth while their opponents preach
propaganda. In order to accommodate the breadth of the CPI's activities, this
discussion relies on Harold Lasswell's broad interpretation of the term. "Neither bombs nor
bread," wrote Lasswell, "but words, pictures, songs, parades, and many similar
devices are the typical means of making propaganda."
According to Lasswell, "propaganda
relies on symbols to attain its end: the manipulation of collective
attitudes."
Propagandists
usually attempt to influence individuals while leading each one to behave "as though his
response were his own decision." Mass communication tools
extend the propagandist's reach and make it possible to shape the attitudes of
many individuals simultaneously. Because propagandists attempt to "do the other
fellow's thinking for him," they prefer indirect messages to
overt, logical arguments. During the war, the CPI accomplished this by making
calculated emotional appeals, by demonizing Germany, by linking the war to the
goals of various social groups, and, when necessary, by lying outright.
Emotional Appeals
CPI
propaganda typically appealed to the heart, not to the mind. Emotional
agitation is a favorite technique of the propagandist, because "any emotion may be
'drained off' into any activity by skillful manipulation."
An article which appeared in Scientific Monthly shortly after the war
argued that "the
detailed suffering of a little girl and her kitten can motivate our hatred
against the Germans, arouse our sympathy for Armenians, make us enthusiastic
for the Red Cross, or lead us to give money for a home for cats."
Wartime slogans such as "Bleeding Belgium," "The Criminal
Kaiser," and "Make the World Safe For Democracy," suggest that
the CPI was no stranger to this idea. Evidence of this technique can be seen in
a typical propaganda poster that portrayed an aggressive, bayonet-wielding
German soldier above the caption "Beat Back The Hun With Liberty
Bonds." In this example, the emotions of hate and fear were redirected
toward giving money to the war effort. It is an interesting side-note that many
analysts attribute the failure of German propaganda in America to the fact that
it emphasized logic over passion. According to Count von Bernstorff, a German
diplomat, "the
outstanding characteristic of the average American is rather a great, though
superficial, sentimentality," and German press telegrams
completely failed to grasp this fact.
Demonization
A
second propaganda technique used by the CPI was demonization of the enemy. "So great are the
psychological resistances to war in modern nations," wrote
Lasswell "that every
war must appear to be a war of defense against a menacing, murderous aggressor.
There must be no ambiguity about who the public is to hate."
American propaganda was not the only source of anti-German feeling, but most
historians agree that the CPI pamphlets went too far in portraying Germans as
depraved, brutal aggressors. For example, in one CPI publication, Professor
Vernon Kellogg asked "will
it be any wonder if, after the war, the people of the world, when they
recognize any human being as a German, will shrink aside so that they may not
touch him as he passes, or stoop for stones to drive him from their path?"
A
particularly effective strategy for demonizing Germans was the use of atrocity
stories. "A handy rule
for arousing hate," said Lasswell "is, if at first they do not enrage, use an atrocity. It
has been employed with unvarying success in every conflict known to man."
Unlike the pacifist, who argues that all wars are brutal, the atrocity story
implies that war is only brutal when practiced by the enemy. Certain members of
the CPI were relatively cautious about repeating unsubstantiated allegations,
but the committee's publications often relied on dubious material. After the
war, Edward Bernays, who directed CPI propaganda efforts in Latin America,
openly admitted that his colleagues used alleged atrocities to provoke a public
outcry against Germany. Some of the atrocity stories which were circulated
during the war, such as the one about a tub full of eyeballs or the story of
the seven-year old boy, who confronted German soldiers with a wooden gun, were
actually recycled from previous conflicts. In his seminal work on wartime propaganda,
Lasswell speculated that atrocity stories will always be popular because the
audience is able to feel self-righteous indignation toward the enemy, and, at
some level, identify with the perpetrators of the crimes. "A young woman, ravished by the enemy,"
he wrote "yields secret
satisfaction to a host of vicarious ravishers on the other side of the
border."
Anti-German
propaganda fueled support for the war, but it also contributed to intolerance
on the home front. Dachshunds were renamed liberty dogs, German measles were
renamed liberty measles, and the City University of New York reduced by one
credit every course in German. Fourteen states banned the speaking of German in
public schools. The military adversary was thousands of miles away, but German-Americans
provided convenient local scapegoats. In Van Houten, New Mexico, an angry mob
accused an immigrant miner of supporting Germany and forced him to kneel before
them, kiss the flag, and shout "To hell with the Kaiser." In
Illinois, a group of zealous patriots accused Robert Prager, a German coal
miner, of hoarding explosives. Though Prager asserted his loyalty to the very
end, he was lynched by the angry mob. Explosives were never found.
The War to End All Wars
Emotional
appeals and simplistic caricatures of the enemy influenced many Americans, but
the CPI recognized that certain social groups had more complex propaganda
needs. In order to reach intellectuals and pacifists, the CPI claimed that
military intervention would bring about a democratic League of Nations and end
warfare forever. With other social groups, the CPI modified its arguments, and
interpreted the war as "a
conflict to destroy the threat of German industrial competition (business
group), to protect the American standard of living (labor), to remove certain
baneful German influences in our education (teachers), to destroy German music
- itself a subtle propaganda (musicians), to preserve civilization, 'we' and
`civilization' being synonymous (nationalists), to make the world safe for democracy,
crush militarism, [and] establish the rights of small nations et al. (religious
and idealistic groups)." It is impossible to make rigorous
statements about which one of these appeals was most effective, but this is the
advantage that the propagandist has over the communications scholar. The
propagandist is primarily concerned with effectiveness and can afford to ignore
the methodological demands of social science.
Dishonesty
Finally, like most propagandists, the CPI was frequently
dishonest. Despite George Creel's claim that the CPI strived for unflinching
accuracy, many of his employees later admitted that they were quite willing to
lie. Will Irwin, an ex-CPI member who published several confessional pieces
after the war, felt that the CPI was more honest than other propaganda
ministries, but made it clear that "we
never told the whole truth - not by any manner of means."
Citing an intelligence officer who bluntly said "you can't tell them the truth," G.S
Viereck argued that, as on all fronts, victories were routinely manufactured by
American military authorities. The professional propagandist realizes that,
when a single lie is exposed, the entire campaign is jeopardized. Dishonesty is
discouraged, but on strategic, not moral, grounds.
Websites – World War One
Source: PowerPoint –
Propaganda and Censorship – Susan Oliver
Source: Trench
Warfare -Source: YouTube